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Abstract—We consider a “Social Group” of networked nodes,
seeking a “universe” of segments for maximization of their utility.
Each node has a subset of the universe, and access to an expensive
link for downloading data. Nodes can also acquire the universe
by exchanging copies of segments among themselves, at low cost,
using inter-node links. While exchanges over inter-node links
ensure minimum or negligible cost, some nodes in the group try
to exploit the system. We term such nodes as ‘non-reciprocating
nodes’ and prohibit such behavior by proposing the “Give-and-
Take” criterion, where exchange is allowed iff each participating
node has segments unavailable with the other. Following this
criterion for inter-node links, each node wants to maximize its
utility, which depends on the node’s segment set available with
the node.
Link activation among nodes requires mutual consent of
participating nodes. Each node tries to find a pairing partner by
preferentially exploring nodes for link formation and unpaired
nodes choose to download a segment using the expensive link
with segment aggressive probability. We present various linear
complexity decentralized algorithms based on Stable Roommates
Problem that can be used by nodes (as per their behavioral
nature) for choosing the best strategy based on available infor-
mation. Then, we present decentralized randomized algorithm
that performs close to optimal for large number of nodes.
We define Price of Choices for benchmarking performance for
social groups (consisting of non-aggressive nodes only). We
evaluate performances of various algorithms and characterize the
behavioral regime that will yield best results for node and social
group, spending the minimal on expensive link. We consider
social group consisting of non-aggressive nodes and benchmark
performances of proposed algorithms with the optimal. We find
that Link For Sure Algorithm performs very close to optimal
and subsidizes the need to consider long term strategies for
maximization of node’s utility.
Index Terms—Device-to-Device Network; Peer-to-Peer Net-
work; Social Groups; Stable Roommates Problem
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
We consider a set of devices using Cellular Network assisted
Device-to-Device (CN-D2D) communication [1], [2] for ful-
filling their content needs (such as a high definition media, set
of files for software update, etc). In CN-D2D, devices connect
to base station using the Long-Term Evolution (LTE), whereas
devices communicate among themselves using WiFi Direct.
Content is broken into smaller segments to facilitate content
dissemination among devices. Each device downloads the
initial subset of segments directly from the base station (using
LTE). Devices store the data and disseminate it to other devices
in a Device-to-Device (D2D) group [3]. Cost of exchanging
segments among devices is negligible as compared to the cost
of downloading segments from the cellular network. In CN-
D2D, the base station facilitates inter-device communication
and also acts as content provider on request of devices.
CN-D2D has a network architecture, which is quite similar
to being observed in many other networks such as hybrid Peer-
to-Peer Content Distribution Network [4], [5], Cloud assisted
Peer-to-Peer Network [6], and Direct Connect Networks (pop-
ularly known as DC++) [7], [8]. We consider a scenario in
which self-interested nodes/devices/peers/users are looking for
some common content. Such a network architecture consist-
ing of inter-connected nodes interested in obtaining common
content is termed as a Social Group [9]. Nodes in Social
Group are unknown to each other and have lack of trust
among themselves. The desire to obtain the same content at
minimal cost is the only shared characteristic among the group
members. To facilitate exchange among nodes, we assume
there is entity called facilitator in network, whose role is to
gather information about networked nodes. Tracker in Cloud
assisted Peer-to-Peer Network [6], base station in CN-D2D [1],
central hub/server in Direct Connect Networks [7], [8], content
distributer in Peer-to-Peer Content Distribution Network [4],
[5] can act as facilitator.
Fig. 1. Base Station and group of networked devices using Cellular Network
Device-to-Device communication
In this paper, any node A’s “selfishness” translates to a
refusal to provide copies of segments to another node B,
unless A receives something in return from B. We refer to
this as the Give-and-Take Criterion [10]–[12]. After exchange,
both A and B will have the union of their individual pre-
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2exchange segment sets. Each node wants to acquire the
universe of segments at low cost via predominantly local
exchanges among nodes, subject to the GT criterion, otherwise
from the content provider in social group.
Cooperation among nodes and reduction of download costs
in social groups [13] in ensured by the GT criterion. Presence
of the GT criterion ensures the absence of non-reciprocating
nodes, i.e. nodes keen to download segments without up-
loading any segments in return. Non-reciprocating behavior
of nodes matches free-riding behavior observed in various
societal systems and communication networks [14], [15]. For
discouraging such non-reciprocating behavior, various meth-
ods and polices have been proposed and implemented in var-
ious societal systems and communication networks [15]–[23].
Policy counterparts of these can be defined for social groups,
but nodes can still exhibit non-reciprocating behavior by doing
collusion, identity fraud etc. [21], [24], [25]. For instance,
peers practicing whitewashing and sybil attack [25] in Peer-
to-Peer network following Bit-torrent’s Tit-for-Tat mechanism
are able to free ride. However, GT criterion is immune to
such malpractices as it requires node to upload segments to the
other node immediately. Hence, to participate in GT-compliant
local exchanges, each node needs to have some segment(s)
with itself — otherwise, it cannot provide any segments to
other nodes as the GT criterion fails. For this reason, each
node downloads an initial set of segments that allows him to
participate in local exchanges in compliance with GT criterion.
The GT criterion applies to local exchanges of segment-
copies among nodes, and such exchanges are very cheap. Also,
each node can download segments from the expensive link
(example LTE link in CN-D2D systems); GT criterion does
not apply for such downloads. As noted above, each node
downloads an initial subset of segments using the expensive
link for kick-starting local exchanges.
Authors in [11] have studied the problem of centralized
scheduling of GT-compliant inter-node exchanges for maxi-
mizing the aggregate cardinality. The motivation was to reduce
aggregate cost of download over the expensive link. However,
the assumption of centralized scheduling need not be true, and
we extend the work where nodes act in a decentralized manner
on their own for maximization of their own utility functions.
We consider a decentralized version of the problem being
studied in [11]. Unlike [11], nodes can accept or reject a link
for activation. For activating a link, mutual consent from the
participating nodes is necessary. Nodes will choose the pairing
nodes based on the utility that will be derived by them in case
of link activation.
Nodes might choose to ignore nodes which will not return
significant utility. To factor such preferential behavior of
nodes, we introduce Preferential Exploration Factor (PEF)
in system model. In some instances, requirement of mutual
consent might leave some1 nodes unpaired. These unpaired
nodes might choose to download new segment via expensive
link based on their aggressiveness for new segments. Segment
Aggressiveness for new segments is factored into system
1Lemma 1 shows that at least one pair of nodes will be give mutual consent
for activation of link.
by introducing Segment Aggressive Probability(SAP) in the
system. We propose practically implementable decentralized
algorithm for nodes, to determine the best strategy for the
node.
For special cases, where nodes might preferentially explore
avenues for link formation, but does not downloads new
segments (after the downloading of initial segment set), we
propose practically implementable decentralized algorithm for
determining the best strategy for node. We define Price of
Choices to compare the equilibrium scenarios emerging due to
decentralized selection of strategies by nodes with the optimal
aggregate utility, which can be obtained through centralized
scheduling. Also, we propose algorithm which can work in
absence of facilitator, but still performing close to optimal.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We use the GT criterion, to prohibit non-reciprocating
behavior in social groups. This, we believe, will help in
understanding the fundamental principles of data sharing
networks consisting of only selfish but contributing nodes.
• We propose a practically implementable decentralized
algorithms for nodes, with preferential nature of ex-
ploration (factored into Preference Exploration Factor)
and aggression for new nodes (factored into Segment
Aggressive Probability) namely, Limited Stable Pairing
Algorithm for deciding upon its strategy in each slot.
• For scenarios consisting of nodes which do not download
new segments (after downloading new segment set), we
use Price of Choices to benchmark performance of our
proposed decentralized algorithms with the optimal.
• We propose Decentralized Randomized algorithm which
can work in the absence of facilitator, but still performing
close to optimal.
Our paper will be arranged as follows: Section II will
describe the system model in detail. Section III presents a
detailed analysis and propose different algorithms depending
on various scenarios. We define Price of Choices in SectionIV.
We evaluate and benchmark performances of various algo-
rithms in Section V. At last we will give our conclusions in
Section VI followed by some open ended problems in Section
VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a set of nodes, M = {1, 2, · · · ,m} and a
universe N = {1, 2, · · · , n} of segments. Each node i ∈ M
has an initial collection of segments Oi ⊂ N .
Give-and-Take (GT) criterion: Two nodes i, j ∈ M with
segment sets Xi and Xj , respectively, can exchange segments
if and only if Xi ∩Xcj 6= ∅ and Xci ∩Xj 6= ∅, i.e. node j
has at least one segment which is unavailable with node i and
vice versa. After exchange, both nodes have the segment set
Xi ∪Xj .
We consider the set of nodes M as the vertices in an
undirected graph G, where an edge or link exists between
two vertices i, j ∈M if and only if they satisfy GT criterion.
We denote the link between nodes i and j by the unordered
2-tuple (i, j). Both nodes i and j will posses their individual
segment sets before exchange. Link (i, j) can be activated with
the consents of node i and j only.
3We observe the system at epochs of various discrete decision
slots, r ∈ N. Dynamic graph at the beginning of rth decision
slot is denoted by G(r) = (M,L(r)), where L(r) denote the
set of links satisfying GT criterion. We define La(r) ⊆ L(r)
to be the set of links being activated in rth slot. Also, li(r)
denotes the set of the nodes, which satisfy the GT criterion
with node i in rth slot.
Let Oi(r) be the segment set available with node i in the
beginning of rth slot. In rth slot, node i will try to pair with
one of the nodes with whom GT criterion is satisfied based
on its preferences. If a node is unpaired, then unpaired node
will download one new segment uniformly at random from
server with a probability based on its aggressiveness for new
segments. Strategy set for node i in rth decision slot is given
by,
Si(r) = li(r)
⋃
{0},
where {0} denotes no pairing strategy of node i. If strategy
{0} is chosen by node i, node i will download one new
segment uniformly at random from the server with segment
with Segment Aggressive Probability (SAP), ai(r) ∈ [0, 1]
(depending upon node’s aggressiveness for new segments).
Node i might limit its preferences for exploring possibilities of
link formation based on Preference Exploration Factor (PEF),
ei(r) ∈ [0, 1].
Strategy chosen by node i in rth decision slot is denoted
by si(r) ∈ Si(r). s−i(r) denotes set of strategies adopted
by all nodes in M\{i}. Link (i, j) can be activated in rth
slot iff si(r) = j and sj(r) = i. S(r) = [si(r)]m×1 is a
column vector, where ith element denotes the strategy chosen
by node i in rth slot. Also, Sˆ(r) = [S(1),S(2) · · ·S(r)] is a
collection of all column vectors S(r). Cexp(r) = [ci(r)]m×1
is a column vector, where ith element denotes the number of
segments downloaded by node i till the end of rth slot.
Node i’s utility2. Also, ui(r + 1) = ui(r) +
∆ui(r, si(r), s−i(r)), where ∆ui(r, si(r), s−i(r)) :
(Oi(r), si(r), s−i(r)) → R+
⋃ {0}. U¯(r) =
[u1(r), u2(r) · · ·um(r)] denotes the vector of utilities in
the beginning of rth slot. We also define the utilitarian
function, u (r) =
∑
i∈M ui (r) to be used in Section IV.
A series of activation of links in decision slots will eventu-
ally lead to a slot rend, where GT criterion is not satisfied for
any pair of nodes in M. Also, U¯(r) = U¯(rend)∀ r ≥ re.
Given an initial collection of segment sets Oi(1), node i
chooses a series of strategies [si(1), si(2) · · · si(rend − 1)] so
that utility ui(rend) is maximized.
Assumptions
A1: Cost of exchange among nodes is zero or negligible as
compared to the cost of downloading the segment from
outside the set M similar to [13]. Cost of downloading
any one segment using the expensive link is cexp.
A2: Oi(1) 6= ∅, and Oi 6=
⋃
j∈MOj = N , ∀ i ∈M.
2For the purpose of analysis, we have assumed ui(r) to be strictly
increasing w.r.t. to cardinality of segment set as outlined in A3., ui(r) in
the beginning of rth decision slot, is a function of the segment set Oi(r)
available with node i, i.e. ui(r) : Oi(r)→ R+
A3: Each of the node has the same utility function, f (·),
which is a strictly increasing function of cardinality of
segment set available with node, i.e.
ui(r) = f (|Oi(r)|) ∀i ∈M and r ∈ N
and ∀x, y ∈ N, x > y =⇒ f (x) > f (y)
A4: In the beginning of each slot, each node has information
about the various segment sets available with all other
nodes (provided by facilitator), though nodes choose
their strategies in a decentralized manner. (We remove
this assumption while analyzing Randomized Strategy
Selection in Section III-B.)
Maximizing the Node’s Objective
In the problem, each node chooses a series of strategies for
maximization its own utility. However, utility gain of choosing
a strategy depends on choice of strategies by other nodes
as well. Objective function from node’s perspective can be
written as,
max ui(rend) = f (|Oi(rend)|) (1)
subject to: si(r) ∈ Si(r) ∀ i ∈M,r ∈ {1, 2 · · · rend − 1}
Each node tries to maximize its utility by means of choosing
strategies in each slot so that utility of the node towards the
end can be maximized. While, choosing a strategy in each
slot, node i should consider its impact on future strategies
of the other nodes, which in turn will be affecting the future
strategies of node i. For the sake of analysis in this paper,
we consider nodes to be myopic in deciding their strategies
in each slot. i.e., nodes explore various opportunities for link
formation and choose the one returning the best immediate
utility gain. Immediate utility gain for node i in rth slot can
be defined as,
∆ui(r, si(r), s−i(r) =
{
g (i, si(r), r) , if ssi(r)(r) = i
0 Otherwise
where, g (i, j, r) = f
(∣∣∣Oj(r)⋃Oi(r)∣∣∣)− f (|Oi(r)|)
Our problem of finding an appropriate pairing nodes in each
slot can be modeled as Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
and Incomplete Lists (SRPTI) [26]. Each node i ∈ M has a
preference list3 for set of nodes in li(r), such that, node j1
is strictly preferred over node j2 in rth slot, iff g(i, j1, r) >
g(i, j2, r)∀ j1, j2 ∈ li(r). Stable Matching as defined in [26],
[27] exists iff all nodes are able to find a pairing node. Stable
matching need not exist always. But, there might exist some
matchings in which only some nodes are able to find stable
pairing node. Such matchings consisting of at least 1 stable
pair are termed as Partial Stable Matching (PSM).
Imposition of restrictions on utility functions (as per A3)
in context of our problem, ensures existence of PSM in each
slot. We obtain PSM in each slot using the concepts devised
in Phase 1 of proposed algorithms of [26], [27].
3Node i may choose to ignore some nodes in li(r) based on value of PEF
for node i in rth slot,ei(r)
4Hence, we solve (1) by repeatedly modeling it as SRPTI. We
obtain the utilities obtained in a decentralized manner under
the various behavioral factors such as SAP and PEF. Analysis
of the utilities towards the end, helps in characterizing the
download costs incurred by the individual nodes in the social
group over the expensive link for obtaining a desired common
content.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Deterministic Strategy Selection
We assume that the nodes are myopic and choose strategies
based on immediate utility increment in a slot. Strategy being
chosen by node i, will yield positive utility iff other node also
choses node i as the strategy. A pair of nodes i and j forms
a stable pair, iff 6 ∃ k, which i prefers over j, and node i is
not preferred by node k over its current partner. Pair of nodes
returning the best immediate utility in a slot is a stable pair,
however, vice versa need not be true.
Best immediate utility to node i in rth slot is given by
max
si(r),s−i(r)
∆ui (r, si (r) , s−i (r)).
For each r ≤ re, consider a directed graph based on
first preferences of the nodes Gf (r) = (M,Lf (r)), where
Lf (r) =
{
i→ j : j ∈ arg max
j′∈li(r)
g(i, j′, r)
}
. Link between
node i and j is bi-directional i ↔ j iff i → j and j → i
are present in Lf (r). A path in Gf (r) is a cycle, if there
exists a sequence of nodes (i1, i2 · · · iq, i1) such that links
ip → ip+1 ∈ Lf (r)∀ 1 ≤ p ≤ q − 1 and iq → i1 ∈ Lf (r).
Lemma 1. For all r ≤ rend, each cycle in Gf (r) contains at
least one bidirectional link.
Proof: There are no self loops by definition of GT
criterion. Hence, cycle will have more than 1 node. Also,
by definition of bidirectional link, cycle with 2 nodes is a
bidirectional link.
Let us consider a cycle with q nodes (2 < q ≤ m) namely
(i1, i2, · · · iq, i1). If possible, let there be no bidirectional link
in the cycle.
Since, node i2 returns the best utility to node i1, therefore,
g(i1, i2, r) ≥ g(i1, iq, r)
⇒ f
(∣∣∣Oi2(r)⋃Oi1(r)∣∣∣) ≥ f (∣∣∣Oiq (r)⋃Oi1(r)∣∣∣)(2)
Also, existence of equality in Eq. 2⇒ i1 → iq ∈ Lf (r), there-
fore, link between node i1 and iq is bidirectional. Rewriting
Eq. 2,
f
(∣∣∣Oi2(r)⋃Oi1(r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oiq (r)⋃Oi1(r)∣∣∣) (3)
Similarly, node i3 returns the best utility to node i2, there-
fore,
f
(∣∣∣Oi3(r)⋃Oi2(r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oi1(r)⋃Oi2(r)∣∣∣) (4)
Continuing in this manner we will get a set of inequalities
like Eq. 3 and Eq. 4
f
(∣∣∣Oi2(r)⋃Oi1(r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oiq (r)⋃Oi1(r)∣∣∣)
f
(∣∣∣Oi3(r)⋃Oi2(r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oi1(r)⋃Oi2(r)∣∣∣)
f
(∣∣∣Oi4(r)⋃Oi3(r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oi2(r)⋃Oi3(r)∣∣∣)
...
f
(∣∣∣Oiq (r)⋃Oiq−1(r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oiq−2(r)⋃Oiq−1(r)∣∣∣)
f
(∣∣∣Oi1(r)⋃Oiq (r)∣∣∣) > f (∣∣∣Oiq−1(r)⋃Oiq (r)∣∣∣)
Since the above set of inequalities is inconsistent, there is a
contradiction. Therefore, there exists at least one bidirectional
link in the cycle.
Corollary 1 (Existence of Partial Stable Matching). For all
r ≤ rend, PSM exists in rth slot.
Proof: Lemma 1 proves existence of a pair of nodes i
and j such that activating link (i, j) returns the best immediate
utility to nodes i and j in rth slot. Such a pair of nodes is a
Stable Pair. Hence, Partial Stable Matching exists.
Partial Stable Matching (PSM) can also be defined as a
collection of stable pairs such that no two stable pairs share
a common node. PSM such that no two nodes among the
unpaired nodes satisfy the GT criterion is defined as Maximal
Partial Stable Matching (MPSM). Also, we define Limited
Preference Stable Matching (LPSM)4 is a stable matching,
such that each of the paired nodes is paired with node in its
preference list limited by individual PEF’s of the paired nodes.
Node i will limit its preference to top most
max (bei(r) |li(r)|c, 1) nodes in its preference list, where
ei(r) is Preference Exploration Factor in rth slot and |li(r)|
denotes the degree of node i in G(r). If values of PEF is very
low, ei(r) ≤ 1
m− 1 , then effectively G(r) will be Gf (r) as
nodes will only have top preference in their preference list.
For each unpaired node i in rth slot, si(r) = {0} and node
i will download a segment from (Oi(r))
c uniformly at random
with Segment Aggressive Probability, ai(r).
Each of the node will be follow the Limited Stable Pairing
Algorithm as outlined in Algorithm 1. If each of the nodes
follows Algorithm 1, then LPSM will be obtained in each
slot. Algorithm 1 is based on algorithms being proposed for
various variants of Stable Roommates Problem in [26], [27].
These algorithms are extended to incorporate PEF and SAP.
Algorithm 1 will be reduced to Preferential Exploration
Pairing Algorithm if nodes in social group decide not to
download new segments i.e. ai(r) = 0 ∀ i ∈ M, r > 0.
However, nodes in each slot limit their preferences to top
max (1, bei(r) |li(r)|c) nodes returning the maximum utility.
We will obtain LPSM matching in each slot of Algorithm 2.
If nodes are open to pairing with any of the nodes in all
slots, i.e. ei(r) = 1∀i ∈ M, r > 0, then Algorithm 2 can
4MPSM can be treated as a special case of LPSM, in which ei(r) = 1∀i ∈
M
5Algorithm 1 Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm for node i
Require: Knowledge of Oj(r)∀j ∈ M to node i and
ei(r), ai(r)∀r > 0
1: for all slots r > 0 do
2: Arrange all nodes in order of their decreasing incre-
mental utilities.
3: Choose top max(1, bei(r) |li(r)|c) nodes from the list
4: while (Preference list is non-empty) or (node i does
not have a partner) do
5: Propose a link to node j at head of preference list
6: if node j accepts i then
7: Activate link between node i and j.
8: end if
9: end while
10: if node i is unable to find a pairing node then
11: Randomly choose X with probability distribution
P(X = 1) = ai(r) = 1− P(X = 0)
12: if X=1 then
13: Choose e ∈ Oci (r) uniformly at random.
14: Oi(r + 1)← Oi(r)
⋃ {e}
15: ci(r)← ci(r − 1) + cexp(e)
16: end if
17: end if
18: r ← r + 1
19: end for
Algorithm 2 Preferential Exploration Pairing Algorithm for
node i
Require: Knowledge of Oj(r)∀j ∈ M to node i and
ei(r)∀r > 0
1: for all slots r > 0 do
2: Arrange all nodes in li(r) in decreasing order of their
incremental utilities.
3: Choose top max(1, bei(r) |li(r)|c) nodes from the list
4: while (Preference list is non-empty) or (node i does
not have a partner) do
5: Propose a link to node j at head of preference list
6: if node j accepts i then
7: Activate link between node i and j.
8: end if
9: end while
10: r ← r + 1
11: end for
be further reduced to Link for Sure algorithm. In this case,
MPSM matching will be obtained in each slot.
B. Randomized Strategy Selection
For deterministic strategy selection, we assume nodes know
about segment sets available with each of the nodes in each slot
(Assumption A4), which requires overhead communication
among nodes with the help of facilitator. This assumption
might not hold true in general. For such scenarios, nodes
would choose their partner nodes at random in each slot. We
propose and analyze a randomized algorithm being followed
by nodes for selection of nodes to activate links.
Algorithm 3 Link for Sure Algorithm for node i
Require: Knowledge of Oj(r)∀j ∈M to node i
1: for all slots r > 0 do
2: Arrange all nodes in li(r) in decreasing order of their
incremental utilities.
3: while (List is non-empty) or (node i does not have a
partner) do
4: Propose a link to node j at head of list
5: if node j accepts i then
6: Activate link between node i and j.
7: end if
8: end while
9: r ← r + 1
10: end for
In the beginning of each slot, each node i, chooses a node
among M\{i}. If the chosen node also chooses node i, then
link is activated among them if the GT criterion is satisfied.
This process is continued until no link exists in graph among
the nodes (L(r) = ∅).
Algorithm 4 Decentralized Randomized Algorithm for node
i
1: for all decision epochs do
2: Choose a node j uniformly at random from M\{i}.
3: if node j chooses node i then
4: if GT criterion is satisfied by nodes i and j then
5: Activate link between node i and j.
6: end if
7: end if
8: end for
Algorithm 4 is based on algorithm being used in Bittorrent
based peer-to-peer networks [18], [28] and GT-compliant peer-
to-peer networks [10].
Algorithm 4 is applicable irrespective of the number of the
initial segments available with nodes however, for the sake of
analysis, we assume node i has chosen k ∈ {1, 2, 3 · · ·n− 1}
segments uniformly at random from the universe N .
Theorem 1. If initial segments sets (Oi’s) are chosen uni-
formly at random from N , with |Oi| = k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1,∀i ∈
M, then the randomized algorithm is asymptotically optimal5
in m, i.e. for large m,
E
(∑
i∈M |Oi(re)|
)
nm− (m mod 2) → 1
Proof: In each decision epoch r, various link activations
might take place. A link between node i and j at decision
epoch r will be activated iff, (a) node i chooses node j;
(b) node j choose node i; and (c) GT criterion is satisfied
between nodes i and j at decision epoch r.
For notational convenience, let x(r,i) = |Oi(r)| , where
Oi(r) denotes the segment set available with node i in
beginning of decision slot r. Also, let s(r,i) denote the node
5(a mod b) denotes the remainder when a is divided by b, where a, b ∈ N
and a ≥ b.
6chosen6 in slot r by node i. At start of first decision slot, each
node has x(1,i) = k segments, that are uniformly randomly
picked from the universe N . Since algorithm is random, we
choose node i without the loss of any generality. Let node i
choose node jr in rth decision slot, i.e s(r,i) = jr, where jr
is chosen uniformly at random from M\{i}.
The segment set at node i in beginning of slot r is
Oi(r) =
{
e1, e2 · · · e|Oi(r)|
}
. For every decision slot r, and
any segment e ∈ Oi(r), we define random variables Xe(jr, r):
Xe(jr, r) =
{
1 if e 6∈ Oi(r)
0 otherwise
For slot 1, node i’s segment set cardinality can increase after
exchange,
(
x(2,i) − x(1,i)
)
, will equal the number of segments
that are available with node j1 but not with node i, iff s(r,jr) =
i i.e.
(
x(2,i) − x(1,i)
)
=

∑
e∈Oi(r)Xe if
s(r,i) = jr, s(r,jr) = i,
jr ∈ Si(r)
0 otherwise
Now,
E
(
x(2,i) − x(1,i)
)
= E
 ∑
e∈Oi(1)
Xe
∣∣∣∣∣∣
s(1,i) = j1,
s(1,j1) = i,
j1 ∈ Si(1)
P
s(1,i) = j1,s(1,j1) = i,
j1 ∈ Si(1)

(a)
= |Oj1(1)|P (Xe = 1)P(s(1,i) = j1)P(s(1,j1) = i)P(j1 ∈ Si(1))
= k ·
(
1− k
n
)
· 1
m− 1 ·
1
m− 1 ·
(
1− 1(n
k
))
=
k
(m− 1)2
(
1− k
n
)(
1− 1(n
k
)) (5)
where (a) follows from linearity of expectation and indepen-
dence of events.
Using E(x(1,i)) = k, rewriting Eq. 5 as,
E(x(2,i)) = E(x(1,i)) +
E(x(1,i))
(m− 1)2
(
1− E(x(1,i))
n
)(
1− 1( n
E(x(1,i))
))
(6)
To proceed further in analysis, we assume the segment sets ob-
tained in the beginning of second slot to uniformly distributed
with each node having a cardinality of E(x(2,i)).
Generalizing Eq. 6 for any r and approximating
(
n
k′
) ≈
Γ(n+ 1)
Γ(k′ + 1)Γ(n− k′ + 1) for non-integer k
′, we get,
E(x(r+1,i)) ≈ E(x(r,i))+
E(x(r,i))Γ
(
E(x(r,i)) + 1
)
Γ
(
n− E(x(r,i)) + 1
) [
n− E(x(r,i))
]
nΓ(n+ 1)(m− 1)2
(7)
Sequence E(x(r,i)) is monotonically non-decreasing and
bounded above by n; hence sequence converges to n for large
enough m. Hence, each node gets n segments asymptotically.
6s(r,i) is different from si(r) as defined in Section II.
Thus, asymptotically in m, i.e. for large number of nodes
aggregate cardinality approaches optimal aggregate cardinality
(by use of Corollary 2) i.e. nm− (m mod 2). Therefore, for
large m,
E
(∑
i∈M |Oi(re)|
)
nm− (m mod 2) → 1
IV. PRICE OF CHOICES
Considering social group with non-aggressive nodes (i.e.
ai(r) = 0∀i ∈ M, r > 0), each node has many choices
and can be matched in numerous ways at each slot. Since,
the utility being earned by a node also depends on choice
made by other node. Each choice of the a node in a slot can
lead to different matching, hence can lead to different utilities
for the node towards the end. Only few nodes will be able
to get the desired utilities towards the end of all exchanges.
However, there exists a series of choices such that aggregate
utility of all nodes can be maximized towards the end of
all exchanges. Owing to their selfishness to maximize their
individual utilities, each nodes makes choices which might be
optimal for it, but not for the social group.
Such situations are observed in various other scenarios as
well, where owing to selfish behavior of a agents/players
system tends to deviate from the optimal behavior. The Price
of Anarchy (PoA) [29] is one such game theoretic concept
to measure degradation in the efficiency of a system due to
selfish behavior of agents involved. It is a general notion that
has been extended to diverse systems and notions of efficiency
[30]–[33]. The Price of Anarchy is defined as the ratio between
the optimal ‘centralized’ solution and the ‘worst equilibrium’.
Different notions of equilibrium lead to variations in notion
of Price of Anarchy as Pure PoA [34], [35], Strong PoA [36],
Bayes-Nash PoA [35], Price of Stability [37] etc.
We define Price of Choices (PoC)7 as the ratio between the
optimal ’centralized’ solution and the ’utilitarian function’ at
the end.
PoC(Sˆ(rend)) =
α∗
U(rend)
where α∗ denotes the optimal ‘centralized’ solution and
U(rend) denotes the aggregate utility of all nodes at the end of
all exchanges if choices specified by Sˆ(rend) are being made.
For further analysis, we assume ui(r) = |Oi(r)|. Hence,
U(rend) denotes the aggregate cardinality of all nodes at the
end of all exchanges. Correspondingly, α∗ denotes the optimal
aggregate cardinality that can be obtained by the GT compliant
exchanges in the social group. The problem of computing α∗
has been addressed in [11].
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm(LSPA) Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the Algorithm 1 namely,
Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm (LSPA) for different social
group scenarios. Each scenario consists of Segment Aggressive
7PoC is only defined for cases where nodes are non-aggressive, i.e. ai(r) =
0∀i ∈M, r > 0
7Probability (SAP) chosen from a discrete set, Preferential
Exploration Factor (PEF) chosen from a discrete set, and a 3-
tuple (number of nodes m, universe size n, initial segment size
k). For sake of simplicity, in each scenario SAP and PEF are
same across all nodes and slots. For each scenario we perform
Monte Carlo simulations where the initial segments sets are
chosen uniformly at random.
We consider the two metrics of interest namely,
• Normalized Mean Aggregate Cardinality (NMAC): It is
defined as the ratio of Mean Aggregate cardinality to mn.
NMAC characterizes the fraction of segments which have
been obtained by all nodes either by using the inter-node
links or downloading from the server for a given value
of SAP and PEF. Mathematically, NMAC is the mean of∑
i∈M|Oi(rend)|
mn over all trials.
• Normalized Mean number of Segments Downloaded
(NMSD):It is defined as the ratio Mean number of seg-
ments downloaded from server to mn. NMSD charac-
terizes the fraction of segments that has been obtained
from server. Mathematically, NMSD is the mean of∑
i∈M ci(rend)
mn
Figures 2 and 3 shows the variation of NMAC and NMSD with
PEF for different values of SAP for social groups consisting of
varied sets of (m,n, k) For each set of (m,n, k), 500 sample
points were used to compute NMAC and NMSD. For a given
SAP, with the increasing PEF fraction of universe obtained
by node increases. but number of segments downloaded from
the server decreases. However, for a given PEF with the
increasing SAP, fraction of universe obtained by nodes also
increases at the expense of increased number of segments
being downloaded from the server. Therefore, low value of
SAP (i.e. lower aggression for new segments) and high PEF
(i.e. exploring large number of possibilities for link formation)
can yield high fraction of universe being available to nodes
(i.e. high utility) towards the end of system. Ideally, all nodes
in Social Groups should have SAP = 0 and PEF = 1.
B. Price of Choices
Figure 4 evaluates the performance of various algorithms
(Algorithm 2,3 and 4) namely, Preferential Exploration Pair-
ing Algorithm (PEPA) for various values of PEF, Link for Sure
Algorithm (LSA) and Randomize Algorithm. For a particular
set of (number of nodes m, universe size n, initial segment
size k) values, we generate 1000 segment sets uniformly at
random. For each such ‘sample point’ or ’run’ the optimal
aggregate cardinality is computed using the algorithms/methos
described in [11] and each of the algorithms simulated. For
each sample run, PoC is computed for each of the algorithm.
Mean PoC (over 1000 sample points) are shown, along with
95% confidence interval.
Our results show that Link for Sure Algorithm (LSA)
performs the best– it is able to achieve the lowest Price of
Choices (PoC) close to 1. The value of PoC increases, as
PEF decreases for PEPA. PoC for Randomized Algorithm also
closely follows PoC for LSA. In spite of differences among
LSA and Randomized algorithm, one can observe that values
of PoC obtained for the simulations is within 10% of the
desired value of PoC, i.e. 1.
Some key observations:
• PoC for Algorithm 3 LSA is very close to 1.
• PoC for Algorithm 2 decreases with the increasing value
of Preferential Exploration Factor (PEF).
• PoC for Randomized algorithm decreases as the number
of nodes increases: This follows from Theorem 1. Ran-
domized algorithm performs close to optimal as number
of nodes increases, which leads to decrease in the value
of PoC as verified using simulations.
Our results indicate that following decentralized algorithm
Link for Sure Algorithm will bring it quite close to optimal
scenarios. Also, the linear complexity of O(m) for the this
algorithm8 makes them quite useful for practical applications
as well. However, social group needs to bear cost for overhead
for sending information about segment sets to all nodes
(Assumption A4).
In case, social group does not want to bear the cost of over-
head for sending information, nodes can use the Randomized
algorithm at the expense of inefficiency as compared to Link
for Sure Algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The problem studied in this paper is motivated in context of
a common network architecture namely Social Groups (being
observed in various socio-technological networks namely, Cel-
lular Network assisted Device-to-Device, Cloud assisted Peer-
to-Peer Networks, hybrid Peer-to-Peer Content Distribution
Network and Direct Connect Networks), where each member
is interested in maximizing its own utility (which is an in-
creasing function of cardinality of node). These decentralized
mutual exchanges will not only get nodes segments at low cost,
but also decrease the cost of operation for the central server.
However, to tackle the problem of non-reciprocating behavior
arising in such situations, we use the GT criterion [11], and
explore a number of algorithms for exchange of segments,
with each exchange to be GT-compliant.
Nodes based on their aggressiveness for new segments and
preferential exploration nature can choose its strategies using
Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm. If node is not aggressive
for new segments, but still restricted about its preferences for
exchanges, then Preferential Exploration Pairing Algorithm
can be used for choosing the strategy in each slot. Link for Sure
Algorithm can be used by nodes for deciding their strategies,
which do not restrict their preferences. Following (practically
implementable linear complexity) LFS algorithm for deciding
the myopic strategy in each slot, we observe that PoC is within
3% of the desired PoC of 1 at no additional cost to nodes.
This also reduces the need to consider the impact of choosing
a strategy in a slot on future strategies as well which might
come at a high computational cost to node.
However, all algorithms require information about the avail-
ability of segment sets in each slot, which might be unavail-
able, in that case nodes can use randomized algorithm.
8Complexity for computing Maximal Partial Stable Matching (MPSM) in
each slot is same as that of computing Stable roommate matching i.e. O(m2)
8(a) Normalized Mean Aggregate Cardinality (b) Normalized Mean number of Segments Downloaded
Fig. 2. Variation of Normalized Mean Aggregate Cardinality and Normalized Mean number of Segments Downloaded with PEF for different values of SAP
for (m,n, k) ≡ (20, 50, 6)
(a) Normalized Mean Aggregate Cardinality (b) Normalized Mean number of Segments Downloaded
Fig. 3. Variation of Normalized Mean Aggregate Cardinality and Normalized Mean number of Segments Downloaded with PEF for different values of SAP
for (m,n, k) ≡ (30, 60, 5)
To summarize, low aggressiveness for new segments and
exploration of maximum possibilities for link formation is in
interest of the node as well as Social Group.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Some of the algorithms in this paper require information
about availability of segment sets in each slot to be made
available to each node. The same can be practically imple-
mented with the help of facilitator (which plays role similar to
tracker in P2P networks). Inherently, it was assumed that nodes
provide the information on segment availability truthfully,
which might not be true. There might be scenarios where
falsifying information can give undue benefits to some node(s).
Also, in this work, we have assumed that all nodes have
homogeneous utility function, which is a strictly increasing
function of cardinality of node. However, node(s) may have
utility functions which do not fall within the scope. Hence, we
will like to study the node’s evolution when social group con-
sists of nodes with heterogeneous and generic utility functions.
With heterogeneous utility functions, nodes might choose to
follow different algorithms. We will like to analyze scenarios
where nodes have heterogeneous and generic utility functions
along with following different decentralized algorithms. Fur-
ther, we will like to consider systems with different exchange
criterion.
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APPENDIX A
STABLE ROOMMATES PROBLEM AND VARIANTS
The stable-roommate problem (SRP) is the problem of
finding a stable matching among a pair of elements, such that,
there is no pair of elements, each from a different matched set,
where each member of the pair prefers the other to their match
[27]. In a given instance of the stable-roommates problem
(SRP), each of m participants ranks the other participants in
order of preference. A matching is a set of m2 disjoint pairs of
participants. A matching M in an instance of SRP is stable if
there are no two participants x and y, each of whom prefers
the other to his partner in M . Such a pair is termed as stable
pair.
Multiple variants of the SRP have been proposed and
studied by researchers. We consider one such variant namely,
Stable Roommates Problem with Ties and Incomplete lists
(SRPTI), in which, the participants are allowed to have ties
among participants and can chose to ignore certain participants
[26]. Our problem is each slot can be mapped to an instance
of SRPTI. Stable Matching as defined in [26], [27] exists iff
all participants are able to find a pairing participant. But, there
might exist some matchings in which only some participants
are able to find stable pairing participants. We term such
matchings as Partial Stable Matching.
We have defined Limited Preference Stable Matching and
Maximal Partial Stable Matching in context of our problem.
APPENDIX B
Lemma 2 (Rewriting Lemma 1 of [11]). For any order of
link activations (resulting in a completely disconnected graph)
and Oi (
⋃
j∈MOj∀i ∈ M, at least two nodes will have⋃
i∈MOi.
Proof: Please refer to proof for Lemma 1 of [11].
Corollary 2. For any order of link activations (resulting in a
completely disconnected graph) optimal aggregate cardinality
is upper bounded by nm− (m mod 2).
Proof: Trivial upper bound on aggregate cardinality is
given by nm as system consists of m nodes and n segments.
For odd number of nodes, it follows from the fact that number
of nodes with universe can be even only. Hence, considering
the best possible scenario where m − 1 nodes have got the
universe. And node without universe will have at least 1
segment missing, therefore, optimal aggregate cardinality is
upper bounded by nm− (m mod 2).
